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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
THeE NEW LAW OF NATIONS*
EDWIN D. DICKINSON 1
I
In these disillusioned years which are the aftermath of the
World War the law of nations has come to be regarded in many
quarters with a kind of sophisticated skepticism. It is freely assert-
ed that the law has proved a futile reliance, that it has broken
down, and it is asked-with an air of unbelief too obvious to be
misunderstood-What is there that is ever likely to be done about
it?
The answers provoked have not been altogether satisfying. It
has been said, truly enough, no doubt, that the skeptical observer
expected too much and must now pay for his extravagance in dis-
illusionment.2 The retort may explain but it is not encouraging.
It has been replied, again, that there is a great deal of the law of
nations which remains untouched by war or post-war disintegration
and that this is the solid foundation upon which a new and more
substantial system must be built.' This reply is more reassuring,
so far as the present situation is concerned, and it may be substan-
tiated easily by anyone who is sufficiently interested to inform
himself about the subject matter. But it does not allay misgiv-
ings about the future. Men have dwelt before "under a sky of
promises.
* An address delivered before the West Virginia State Bar Association, Parkers-
burg, West Virginia, October 9, 1925.
Advantage has been taken of this printing to add annotations giving the sources
of quotations, citations of cases mentioned In the text, and references to a limited
number' of articles or books which should be of interest to such readers as may
wish to explore the subject 'further.
1 Professor of Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
See MoonE, .INTEnNATiONAL LAW AND SoM: "CURENr ILLUSIONS, ESSAY I (1924).
a See Wilson, "The 'War dm lnternational Lato," in PROBLEMS OF READjUSTIENT
AFTER THE WAR, 129 (1915).
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Another way of meeting the skeptic's challenge is to take the
skeptic's viewpoint, attack the subject critically, and by under-
standing the deficiencies which have been chiefly responsible for
the law's failures in the past to better appreciate the constructive
forces which are certain to deserve more generously of our con-
fidence in the future.4 There is danger in attempting such an ap-
proach but there is also the possibility of more substantial com-
pensations. One may risk a little to glimpse the stuff of which
the new law of nations will be made.
It is of course too evident that anything of the nature of a
critical survey, were I presumptuous enough to undertake it,
would be impossible within the compass of a brief address. Never-
theless, I believe that something may be accomplished briefly,
enough, I hope, to indicate the vanity of the skeptic's challenge,
by defining the attack in three rather elementary but very funda-
mental questions. In the first place, how have nations gained
admission into and retained membership in the great international
communitk to which the law of nations applies? In the second
place, once admitted, what kind of rights have nations acquired
as members in good standing in the great community and what
sort of obligations have they incurred? In the third place, if
rights were flouted or if a neighboring country refused to abide
by its obligations, what could be done about it? Answers to these
questions, even brief and superficial answers, ought to illuminate
some of the more striking deficiencies in the law of nations of the
past. Perhaps they will also help us to appreciate the new law
of nations which even now is emerging to guide the future.
4 "He who would portray the future of international law must first of all be
exact in his attitude towards its past and present." OPPENiEEim, THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1 (1921). "whether fairly or not, the world regards inter-
national law to-day as in need of rehabilitation; and even those who have a con-
fident belief in its future will probably concede that the comparatively small part
that it plays In the sphere of international relations as a whole is disappointing."
J. L, Brierly, "The Shortcomings of International Law." British Year Book of In-
ternational Law, 1924, p. 4. "As an answer to such a challenge, why, is it not
sufficient to establish 'international law' as we have known it hitherto, and as
the international jurists of the past and the present have developed it? Why Is
the feeling so widespread among the public that International Law is largely a
failure, and that the war, and what has happened since the War, has established
its futility? The answer to these questions is, I believe, -to be found largely in
the fact that we international lawyers are rather a timid folk; we have failed to
comprehend what under modern conditions is the full importance and meaning of
our task, and we still tend to cling to conceptions the main utility of *Which has
passed away." Sir John Fischer Williams, "A 'New' International Law," Interna-
tional Law Association, Report of Thirty-Third Conference, 434 (1924). "The
recent war, despite the strain to which it subjected the structure of international
law, has in reality released and made articulate the forces upon which the law de-
pends for its reconstruction and development." Bruce Williams, "Prospective De-
velopment of International Law," 11 VA. I, REv. 169, 182 (1925).
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What is it, then, which has determined nuembership in the great
community? How has a new nation, like Lithuania or Poland, or
an old nation with a new government, like Mexico or Russia, se-
cured its position in the international society of law? If there
have been Ephraimites and Gileadites in the international commun-
ity, by what shibboleth have they been distinguished? Here, upon
the very threshold of international practice, we encounter what
might well have been regarded as an anomalous and extraordinary
principle. Everything has depended upon recognition.r
A new nation, recently organized, may have possessed every ele-
ment essential to an independent existence. It may have had a defi-
nite territory, a numerous population, and an established govern-
Inent independent of external control. Nevertheless, until it was
recognized by the governments of other nations it could not claim
a normal status in the community to which the law of nations ap-
plied. In some respects, indeed, it was no better than an outlaw.
It is conceivable, for illustration, that Czechoslovakia should have
become in fact exactly what it is today, that it should have the
same government, exercising authority over the same tefritory, and
commanding the allegiance of the same people, and yet that Czecho-
slovakia should still be clinging unsteadily to an abnormal and
precarious international position because unrecognized by other
countries. There have been more or less protracted intervals in
recent years when millions of civilized people in eastern Europe
and Asia were living only partially within the aegis of the law
of nations because the states which they had attempted to organize
were denied recognition. And this anomalous situation was by no
means unprecedented in the history of international relationships.
Even after a nation had gained admission to the international
community of law it could be subjected to a kind of outlawry by
the arbitrary refusal of other nations to recognize a change in its
government. Great Britain, for example, refused to have diplo-
matic intercourse with Servia for several years after the murder of
King Alexander in 1903. And more recently the United States
outlawed Mexico temporarily and compelled the Mexicans to
change dictators by withholding recognition. In fine, a people
which wished to enjoy the normal and effective exercise of inter-
nataonal rights must have secured and retained the recognition
of other countries.
I See H p, INTZ A~oNAL L w, I. §o 36-46; OPPNHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Sd ed., , §§ 71-75.
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Stating the rule does not adequately describe the situation.
There has been at least one aspect of the situation which seems
quite as anomalous and extraordinary as the rule itself. The de-
cision to grant or to withhold recognition, upon which so much has
depended, has never been the result of an impartial administrative
or judicial proceeding. It has been a political decision within the
discretion of those officials who happened to be in control of for-
eign relations.8 The officials in control might be influenced by
considerations of policy or they might be influenced by whim or
caprice. The real decision has usually been made in secret; and the
chance, or dicker, or policy which proved decisive has often re-
mained obscure until an ex-diplomat or foreign secretary publish-
ed the recollections of his official life. Such recollections, of course,
have not often been published while there was still an immediate
vital interest in what they had to disclose.
Even less does the mere statement of the rule reveal its impor-
tant ramifications. It fails to reveal that the decision to grant or
to withhold recognition of a new nation or government, once made
in the office in control of foreign relations, has been conclusive
for many important purposes in the same country's courts of
justice. This has been highly significant, for it is in the national
courts of justice that many of the most important and most valued
rules affecting international intercourse have been applied. It is
evident that rules affecting foreign nations or governments could
be applied only where such a nation or government actually exist-
ed. If the political department, by the magic act of recognition,
conceded that a certain foreign nation or government existed, the
courts could take notice of the concession and apply the appro-
priate rule of international law. But if the political department
withheld recognition, for whatever reasons, the courts in some of
the most important cases could take no account of the foreign na-
tion or government. It sometimes resulted that so far as the
national courts were concerned it would have been almost as well
if the unrecognized nation or government had not existed at all.
It has resulted that public and private rights of the greatest
moment have depended at times upon the next move in the un-
certain game of diplomacy. Thus it is a rule of the law of nations,
based upon comity and convenience, that public ships entering
the ports of a friendly country shall enjoy generous exemptions
from the jurisdiction exercised by the local authorities. A few
6 HYDE, op. cit., I, § 41. See the recent case of Duff Development Company v.
Government of Kelantan [1924] A. C. 797.
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years ago two Russian ships sailed into English ports, where they
were arrested on behalf of former Russian owners. One of the
ships had been captured from the Bolsheviki by the provisional
governent of Esthonia. The other had been requisitioned by the
provisional government of :Archangel. The English court which
was called upon to decide these cases addressed two humble in-
quiries to the British Foreign Office, desiring to know about the
Esthonian and Archangel governments respectively. In the one
case the Foreign Office replied that provisional recognition had
been extended to the Esthonian National Council, in the other that
although British authorities were cooperating with the government
at Archangel recognition had not actually been granted. The court
applied the rule accordingly and released the Esthonian ship,
while the ship belonging to the government at Archangel was de-
tained."
There is another rule, somewhat similar to the first, which ac-
cords immunities from jurisdiction to the visiting sovereign of a
friendly country. Some years ago an English maid was wooed and
won by Albert Baker, representing himself to be a loyal subject
of the Queen. The successful suitor did not take his commitment
seriously and the lovelorn maid brought suit for a breach of
promise. No doubt the romance would have proved an expensive
adventure for Albert Baker had it not transpired that the British
Crovernmwent had recognized him as the Sultan of Johore in the
Malay Peninsula. The court dismissed the suit.8
The instances in which important public or private rights have
hung upon the frail thread of recognition might of course be
multiplied. It appears that men capable of insinuating them-
selves into the confidence of a new government have been able to
obtain access to government funds and then live riotously upon
the proceeds until recognition opened the courts to the unfortunate
principal. On the other hand, confiding men have been cheated
by rascals in buying foreign securities only to find the courts
closed to them because recognition had been withheld. And it
has been demonstrated recently in the United States that recogni-
tion withheld may not only produce a legal vacuum in space pre-
viously occupied by substance but may also reverse the process and
create a legal something out of preceding nothingness. Russian
funds, ships, and other public property in America have been ad-
ministered recently for four years or more by a group of men,
7 The Gagara [1919] Probate 95; The Annette -and the Dora [1919] Probate 105;
22 MicE. L. REv. 124.
s Mighell v. Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 Q. B. 149.
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recognized as representing the Russian state, whose sole authority
was derived from a government long since discredited and de-
funct.9
It requires no great accumulation of such instances to convince
lawyer or layman that a system of law in 'Which the rights of gov-
ernments and individuals could be subordinated to the tactics of
an adventurous diplomacy was at best a very imperfect system.
The law of nations has been such a system. Had some misguided
individual proposed for his country a system of private law based
upon this principle-a system in which influential persons could
exclude other persons from the enjoyment of valued rights by
simply refusing to have intercourse with them or to recognize them
as persons-he would have been advised quite appropriately to
consult an alienist. Yet the law of nations has been based upon
just such a principle. If we look beyond the particular instance-
if we view the phenomenon in its entirety-we may envisage the
chaos which must always have threatened so long as an arbitrary
and secret decision could deny to millions of people the normal
conditions of intercourse with other peoples. Surely there was
demonstration enough in the chaos which swept Mexico after the
United States denied recognition to Huerta and drove him from
power, and more recently in the scourge of famine, pestilence, and
terror which devastated eastern Europe after the great powers
determined to outlaw millions of people in order to discredit and
overthrow an obnoxious government.
If the law of nations has been deficient in this respect what has
been done about it? What is there in the progress of the law
of nations which gives promise of a better practice? In despair
of a practical solution for the riddle, some have turned to theory
and have argued that in theory, at least, every state should be
entitled to recognition. Others have urged that'in theory recogni-
tion need not be essential to normal membership in the internation-
al society. Yet it hardly seems likely that the problem could ever
have been solved by such dialectical sleight of hand. The theories
suggested were significant only as they were in some measure
relevant to the facts of international life. It was indispensable
that there should be in fact a right to recognition, that it should
be possible to establish the right in some kind of impartial pro-
ceeding, and that the right once established should be effective
in all international relationships.
0 For further discussion of the problem and a review of cases, see Dickinson,"The Unrecognized Government or State in English and American Law," 22 Mien.
L. PrV. 29, 118; "Recent Recognition Cases," 19 AmERacAw JouRNAL or INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 263; "The Russian Reinsurance Company Case," 19 ibid. 753.
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The solution of the problem awaited, not a new theory, but a
change in practice. It required such readjustments in the consti-
tution of international society that justice might become the dom-
inant consideration where the methods and strategy of politics had
previously prevailed. Thus the essential path of the law's pro-
gress was sufficiently indicated. Sooner or later, by some process
or development, it was indispensable that international relation-
ships or institutions should be created where claims to participate
in the activities of the society of nations could have a hearing,
where they could be considered with as much of impartiality as
is humanly possible, and where recommendations or decisions
could be made which would commend themselves to the opinion of
the world. It was essential that a more closely knit or consciously
organized society of nations should supplant the old anarchy.
When such a new integration had been achieved, then politics
could be compelled to surrender a domain which it was inherently
unfitted to control, the sphere of justice through law could be
extended, and the boundaries between politics and law could be
more adequately defined.
It is none too widely appreciated that this indispensable inte-
gration of the international community has been going on apace.
It has not been deliberately or even consciously related to the prob-
lem of recognition. But it has been developing new international
relationships in which the old absurd practices in respect to recog-
nition can hardly survive. It has been substituting organized co-
operative endeavor for the old anarchy by creating multifarious
international administrative conferences, unions, and bureaus. It
has been establishing first arbitration under special agreements
and later arbitration under a universal scheme in place of more
primitive methods of settling international disputes. Throughout
the nineteenth century there was extraordinary progress in the
development of the international conference in lieu of distant ne-
gotiations handicapped by innumerable opportunities for mis-
understanding." In years so recent that it is impossible to appre-
ciate their significance the same constructive forces have achieved
the systematic reorganization of multifarious international confer-
ences, unions, and bureaus under the auspices of the League of
Nations, crowned the progress of arbitration with the creation of
the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and
crystallized the phenomenal growth of international conferences
- See wOOL, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1916).
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during the nineteenth century in the periodic conferences of the
Council and Assembly of the League of Nations in the twentieth
century.
'The problems of recognition have not been solved. But in a
world thus becoming so rapidly integrated and efficiently organ-
ized we may feel confident that anarchic practices will eventually
disappear. We may feel assured, indeed, that anarchic practices
in respect to such matters as spheres of influence, self-determina-
tion, intervention, and numerous others which might be drawn
upon for illustration if time permitted, where likewise the boundar-
ies between law and politics have been too ill-defined, whiere the
scope and action of law have been too easily obscured in the scuffle
of diplomacy, will also eventually disappear. The progress made
during the past century and the triumph of constructive effort in
these present days give splendid assurance that the new law of na-
tions will rise apart from and above the confusion and intrigue of
diplomacy and be law worthy of the name.
III
Our second inquiry assumed a nation in good standing in the
great community and asked-What manner of rights has it acquir-
ed and what sort of obligations has it incurred? Have these
rights and obligations been something of real significance, some-
thing as substantial in their own sphere as the right in private
law to have stolen goods restored or the obligation to refrain from
defaming a neighbor's reputation? Has the law of nations been
a real sword in punishment of wrongdoing and a strong shield
in defense of right?
Some would prefer to have the question put in another way,
emphasizing the force or lack of force behind the rule rather than
the quality or substance of the rule itself. They would prefer
to inquire-How have a nation's rights been secured or its obli-
gations enforced? Everyone knows that rights in the law of na-
tions have never been secured by means of a supernational execu-
tive giving effect to the decisions of supernational courts. The idea
of a supernational executive or international police has made but
little progress even in academic discussion. Unless it is to be the
new Court of International Justice, we have as yet created no
tribunals capable of exercising supernational authority. Funda-
mentally, international obligations have been respected, not be-
cause they could be announced in court decision and enforced by
an executive arm, but because unreekoned millions of the more
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civilized people of the earth believed that the rules were right.
The law of nations has depended for its observance upon the
opinion of mankind.
Now it has been argued with much acumen that law w~ich de-
pends upon nothing stronger than opinion is not law at all but
mere positive morality. It is the vanishing point of jurisprudence.
It consists, perhaps, of one-half of one percent of legal vitamine
diluted with ninety-nine and one half percent of pious aspiration.
The matter has been much controverted and the controversy has
magnified it out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance.
The really important thing has not been the abstract nature of
the law of nations but rather the quality or practical utility of its
rules. And so we come back to our inquiry in its original form-
What kind of rights has the nation acquired and what sort of
obligations has it incurred. Has the law of nations been a real
sword in punishment of wrongdoing and a strong shield in de-
fense of right?
At the outset it is necessary to take account of the extraordinary
influence upon the law of nations of the great philosophical jurists.
Their ideas have penetrated into every part of the system and
contributed to the development of every important principle.
Their influence has been -two-fold. .In the first place, they have
searched history for evidence of important customs and have
arranged and written down what they were able to discover. In-
ternational customs have been recorded in widely scattered sources.
Until recently there has been little that was comparable to orders,
statutes, or court decisions. Usages have had to be ascertained
from a great unwieldy mass of reports, treaties, awards, state pa-
pers, diplomatic correspondence, and the like. Their discovery
has been peculiarly the province of the trained investigator and
writer. The work has been done chiefly by the great publicists
or jurists. Their writings, in consequence, have been one of the
most influential sources o fthe law of nations. As the Supreme
Court of the United States has remarked, we have resorted to the
great publicists for trustworthy evidence of what the law of na-
tions really is.1
In the second place, the juristie writers have influenced pro-
foundly the development of the law. of nations through their specu-
lations as to what that law ought to be. If the law of nations
had included nothing more than so much of the opinion of mankind
as had actually found expression in approved usage, it would
n The Paquete Habana (1899) 175 U. S. 677. 700.
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have been the most practical system of law in the world. Only
that would have been dignified as law which accorded with con-
duct already become habitual through repetition. Every rule and
principle would have been justified by the accumulated experience
of generations. Thus confined, however, the law of nations would
not only have been less complete than any other system; it would
have been needlessly less complete than it actually came to be at
the close of the last century. It would have been even more re-
mote from the vanguard of humanity's onward march. In every
system of law there has been a wide, unmeasured, uncharted no-
man's land between the actual law established by usage and the
ideal law which might have been desirable if it could have been
attained. In most systems this no-man's land has been in constant
process of being redeemed and at least partially charted by means
of legislation, administrative regulations, judicial decisions, and
the writings of jurists. In the international system, in the ab-
sence of anything really comparable to legislative, administrative,
or judicial organization, the important work of redeeming and
charting has been left largely to the great publicists.? Their
opinions have commanded almost universal respect. As much as
any other single factor, down to the modern period of international
co-operation, their influence has directed the course of the law's
development. Both in their search for trustworthy evidence of
what the law of nations really was, and in their speculations as to
what it ought to have been, the juristic writers have rendered ser-
vices of incalculable value. They have carried the torch of hope
through many a dark night of history.
Paradoxical as it may seem, the influence of the great writers
contributed also to one of the law of nations' most serious defi-
ciencies-the impractical and unsubstantial character of many of
its principles. Nor was the result surprising. Recall that interna-
tional relations were chronically unsatisfactory, if not absolutely
chaotic, and that every great publicist was animated by a desire
to point out a better way. Reflect that in many parts of the vast
field there were no settled customs or at best usages which were
meager and difficult to ascertain. Finally, remember that until
recent times the publicists were unrestrained by the conservative
influence of anything really comparable to administration, legis-
22 "The law of nations was, until the first of the Peace Conferences, essentially
a book-law." OPPENmEUI, THE FUTURE OF INTERATIONAL LAw, 56 (1921). "The
system possesses hardly any of the apparatus of change that exists within a munici-
pal system. Not only has it no legislature, and until recently no courts; but even
the spontaneous growth of a new customary rule Is incomparably more difficult
than it Is within the community of a State." J. L. BrIerly, "The Shortcomings of
International Law," British Year Book of International Law, 1924, pp. 4, 9.
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lation, or the decisions of courts. Is it surprising that they formu-
lated the law of nations in principles sometimes remote from the
facts of international life? Is it remarkable that they created
phantom rights and fanciful obligations? In view of all the eir-
cumstances attending its development, it was inevitable that one
of the outstanding imperfections of the law of nations should
have been its unreality.
The impractical and unsubstantial character of much that has
passed for international law may be illustrated by reference to
one or two characteristic conceptions or principles. Again and
again, for illustration, it was asserted that the subjects of inter-
national law are states which may be regarded much as so many
human beings would be regarded if living together in unorganized
society. One of the most influential publicists of the seventeenth
century declared that "states, once formed, assume the personal
qualities of men."' 3 Probably the most influential publicist of the
eighteenth century began his book with the assertion that "nations
or sovereign states must be regarded as so many free persons
living together in the state of nature."1 4 One of the most renown-
ed English writers of the nineteenth century suggested that states
have "a moral nature identical with that of individuals" and that
"with respect to one another they are in the same relation as that
in which individuals stand to each other who are subject to law. ' "5
These quotations are fairly typical. In one form or another the
analogy between states and human beings was invoked repeatedly
from the time when the law of nations first became a subject of
juristic speculation and practical significance.'"
In reliance upon this analogy, theories which were thought ap-
plicable to human beings were taken over boldly to explain inter-
national relationships. At one time, for illustration, a great deal
of importance was attached to the idea of a state of nature, a sort
of golden age of innocence antedating all human sin and corrup-
tion, in which men lived in primitive simplicity subject only to
natural law. Some of the most influential of the classical publi-
cists adopted this idea, by analogy, to explain international society.
They asserted that states live, with respect to one another, in a nat-
ural society. They did not suggest, however, that the international
state of nature was the golden age. And it remained for some of
23 PuFENDOnr, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTUM, II, i11, 23 (1672).
14 VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, Introd., § 4 (1758).
s HALL, INTERNATIONAL L.'w, 4th ed., § 1 (1895).
1" See Dickinson, "The Analogy Between Natural Persons and International Per-
sons." 26 YALE L. J. 564.
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the diplomatic representatives of a later day to demonstrate that
it was an age of innocence.
There was a time when almost everyone believed in the exist-
ence of an immutable law of nature, ordained by God, and capable
of being ascertained by human reason. The publicists translated
this idea, by analogy, into the law of nations. "Indeed," declared
an influential English writer of the eighteenth century, "if one
understands what the law of nature is when it is applied to individ-
ual persons in a state of equality, he will seldom be at a loss to
judge what it is when he is to apply it to nations considered as
collective persons in a like state of equality.' 7 Many writers even
went so far as to assert that there was no such thing as a law of
nations apart from the laws of God and nature.
A great deal was written in the seventeenth century and after
about fundamental rights. Analogizing again, the publicists
translated notions of fundamental rights into the law of nations.
It was less than a decade ago, indeed, that the American Institute
of International Law issued a Declaration of the Rights of Nations
as a sort of panacea for the ills of a bleeding world. Here ws
the alchemist's formula. It ran as follows: private law protects
certain fundamental rights in human beings--life, liberty, proper-
ty, equality; these rights may be stated in terms of international
law and applied to nations just as they have been applied to in-
dividuals; and so stated, they mean that nations have fundamental
rights to existence, independence, territory, and equality.I'
The analogy between human beings and nations was also used
to justify the taking over into the law of nations of a great many
rules and principles from ordinary private law. Rules of property,
for example, were taken over to explain the nation's territorial
rights, rules of personal status to explain the condition of certain
abnormal communities, and rules of contract to explain the obli-
gation and interpretation of treaties. Deficiencies in inter-
national usage were supplied again and again from the rich
treasury of Roman private law. Indeed, a great jurist of our
own time hag asserted that "the Law of Nations is but private law
'writ large.' It is an application to political communities of those
legal ideas which were originally applied to the relations of indi-
viduals.' 19
17 RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW, II. ix, 5 (1754-6).
I' SCOTT, THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS DECLARATION
OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OP NATIONS (1916). See Root, "The Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Nations," 10 AmERIcAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
211. For critical comment, see Dickinson, "The Equal Rights of Nations," THE
NEW REPUBLIC, vI, 91.
2D HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL Lw, 152 (1898).
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It was probably inevitable that this process of borrowing should
introduce into the law of nations much that was unreal and im-
practical. Some of the notions which were taken over never had
any foundation in the facts of life, as men came eventually to
understand them, and were soon discredited. The system of the
law of nations Was long encumbered by their influence. Much of
the doctrine taken over from private law proved to be unsuited
to nations in their international relationships. Some of the unas-
similable matter was abandoned after controversy. More of it re-
mained to encumber thinking, although rarely significant in prac-
tice.
The truth is that the derivation of the law of nations from other
systems of law by means of analogies, while useful within limits,
was a device which could be easily overdone. Only in a limited
sense were the analogies in harmony with the facts of interna-
tional life. How small or how large, for illustration, was the small-
est or the largest human being which curious folk ever paid ad-
mission to see? Including even the exhibition monstrosities, there
have never existed among human beings any such extraordinary
differences in size and strength as have been common among na-
tions. The little republic of Andorra, for example, is said to
have approximately 5,000 inhabitants; Panama has 400,000; the
United States has over 100,000,000; the British Empire has more
than 440,000,000. The little principality of Monaco has eight
square miles of territory; Haiti has 10,000 square miles; Brazil
includes more than 3,000,000 square miles; and the British imperial
dominion extends over nearly 13,000,000 square miles. There are
many other diversities which have had no parallel among human
beings. Nations have differed as regards the form of their gov-
ernment, the system of their law, and the degree in which they
were really independent from! the control of other countries. Does
anyone suspect, for example, that Cuba has enjoyed the same
degree of independence as Chile, or Persia the same as Denmark?
The physiography of nations has varied greatly, affecting such
vital matters as soil, climate, natural frontiers, and access to the
sea. Compare Japan and Bolivia, or Czechoslovakia and Italy.
The jurist who ignored or minimized these diversities ignored real-
ities quite as much as the blundering American diplomat who in-
vited the government of Switzerland to participate in a naval
demonstration. The more insistently men scrutinized every pos-
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sible basis for analogies between the problems of private law and
the problems of the law of nations, the more impressed they were
certain to be with the lack of real resemblances.
If the law of nations was to have reality, if it was to become a
practical system, it was necessary that its problems be attacked
from an international point of view. The theories and principles
of systems of private law had to be used with the most painstaking
discrimination. Otherwise some perversely logical person might
have reverted eventually to the anthropomorphic conceits of an
earlier time and explained everything. John of Salisbury, author,
diplomatist, and bishop of the twelfth century, represented the
clergy as the soul of the state, the chief executive as the brain, the
senate as the heart, other officials and judges as the eyes, ears, and
tongue, the army as the armed hand, the treasury as the belly and
intestines, and the common people as the feet, so that the state
had more feet than the centipede, while the protection of the
people was the shoeing of the state and their distress was the
state's gout.2" No doubt the learned bishop would have diagnosed
the condition of the United States at the conclusion of the World
War as a case of gout induced by heart failure and complicated
by brain fever. By the saine simple formula, Germany's recent
ailment would have been gout caused by overstuffing the belly
and intestines with a malnutritious currency. Such diagnoses are
more amusing than helpful.
Widely approved notions in regard to the equality of nations
afford another example of the unreality which was certain to
be characteristic of a system of law into which exotic theories had
been introduced too freely. It was asserted repeatedly that states
are equal in the law of nations. The most influential publicist
of the eighteenth century declared that "Since men are by nature
equal, and their individual rights and obligations the same, as com-
ing equally from nature, nations, which are composed of men and
may be regarded as so many free persons living together in a state
of nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same
obligations and the same rights." 21 In the next century, in a lead-
ing English case, Lord Stowell asserted that among nations "rela-
tive magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility,
whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the more
powerful neighbor."2 2 In an equally well-known American case,
so Polycraticus, V. 1 et seq. See GTmKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AG
(Maitland's transl.). 131, n. 76.
VATT L Lz DROrT DES GEMS, (Fenwick's trans].), Introd., J 18.
3Le Louis (1811) 2 Dods. 210, 248.
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decided a few years later, Chief Justice Marshall said, "No prin-
ciple of general law is =ore universally acknowledged, than the
perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal
rights."'23 Former President Wilson declared, in his second inaug-
ural address, that "the essential principle of peace is the actual
equality of nations in all matters of right or privilege. ' 24
Dogmatic notions of equality were not established primarily by
international usage. They were creations chiefly of the juristic
writers and were deduced commonly from the application to the
community of nations of generally accepted theories in regard to
the state of nature, natural law, and natural equality. The logic
of the deduction seems hardly more convincing today than the
reasoning of the sexton who was accustomed to smoke his pipe in
contemplation until he thought that it must be about time for the
bell, and then, having rung the bell, to come in and set his watch
by it. Nevertheless, the notions were convincing in their time, and
they later passed, as Thomas Hobbs would have said, "like gaping,
fron mouth to mouth," until they attained the dignity of funda-
mental principle."
If the equality of nations had been taken to mean no more than
equality before the law, no more than an equal right to the protec-
tion of the law, there could have been no valid objection to it
Equality in this sense was indispensable in any legal system. But
the equality of nations, as the idea Was developed by the publicists,
came to mean much more than equality before the law. As was
said repeatedly, it meant equality of rights or of capacity Tor
rights.
Not only was an equality of capacity for rights widely regarded
as axiomatic in the law of nations, but the principle was applied
without making any distinction whatever between ordinary legal
capacity on the one hand, and political capacity on the other.
The right to participate in international organization was regard-
ed in the same way as the right, for illustration, to use freely the
common highways of the sea. At the Second Hague Conference
of 1907, the delegates representing the great powers were able to
agree upon a plan for a permanent international court of justice.
It was proposed that the court should be constituted for a period
of twelve years and that each nation should appoint one judge.
2 The Antelope (1825) 10 Wh. 66, 122.
2 Congressional Record, 65th Cong., spec. sess. (1917), LV, PL 1, 3.
2 For further discussion, see DiCKxNsoN, THE EQUALITY or STATES *IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (1920). Of. GOEBEL, THE F.UALITY OF STATES (1923). And sm Bakr,
"The Doctrine of Legal Equality of States," British Year Book of International Law,
1923-24, p. 1.
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In order to ensure a small tribunal capable of functioning effect-
ively, it was proposed that the working membership should never
exceed seventeen judges. Those appointed by the eight most
powerful countries were to serve for the full twelve year period,
while those appointed by the smaller countries were to serve in
rotation for shorter periods ranging from one to ten years, the
length of the period in each case depending upon the population,
territory, resources, commerce, and influence of the country repre-
sented. This plan was denounced vehemently by the smaller na-
tions as an encroachment upon their inalienable equality of rights.
The Mexican delegate declared that all countries, great or small,
strong or weak, must be represented upon the proposed court "on
the basis of the most absolute, the most perfect, equality." 2  The
Dominion delegate modestly insisted upon the same representa-
tion as the British Empire. China, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Haiti,
Uruguay, and others joined the chorus. The plan for a permanent
court was defeated.
The jealousy With which small or weak nations regard any
threatened impairment of their rights has never been a thing to be
dismissed lightly. There has been too much in history which justi-
fies it. It calls for sympathetic understanding, not ridicule. Sym-
pathetic understanding, however, does not obscure the fact that
insistence upon the asserted right to equality in such a matter as
the creation of a permanent court simply helped to perpetuate the
old anarchy in which the small or weak nations themselves were
usually the first to perish. The organization of the League of
Nations was criticized in some quarters because of its failure to
assure small countries an equality of participation in all League
institutions. For this, however, it should have been commended.
It simply accommodated itself, in an imperfect way, no doubt, to
the realities of international life. Every one knows that in interna-
tional life nations never have enjoyed and probably never can
enjoy a perfect equality of rights. The differences between them
in population, in territory, in productive capacity, in wealth, in
armed strength, in conceptions of law and right, in habits of
thought, in brief, the differences in almost everything which has
contributed to make up civilization, have always made an actual
equality impossible. Insistence upon an unreal principle, there-
LA DEUXEME CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA PAX, 1907, II, 650.
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fore, has only served to project the law of nations into a world of
fictions wherein the necessities of international life were unneces-
sarily beclouded1
7
If the unreal and impractical character of many of its principles
has been an outstanding characteristic of the law of nations in the
past, what has been done about it? What progress has been made
in shifting emphasis from unreal analogies and illusive doctrines
to the progressive amplification and inprovement of those common
rules which really help nations to settle their differences decently
and live in peace? What is the prospect for a more reilistic and a
more useful system?
There has been encouragement for at least a century past in
the growing disposition of jurists to take a more realistic attitude
toward international problems. The modern tendency, if I may so
describe it, has been to seek the ideal from the world of realities
as a starting point instead of constructing aircastles first and try-
ing to persuade the world to move in afterwards. This has con-
tributed much of value to the progress of the law of nations. But
it has not been capable alone of satisfying the need for a more
substantial and comprehensive system. Notwithstanding its val-
uable contribution, the law of nations has remained a system made
up of a modicum of settled usage rather thinly diluted by diverg-
ent juristic opinions as to what the law ought to be.
Here, again, the achievements of the more recent past which
have justified the highest hopes for the future have been the pro-
gressive integration and the more effective organization of the in-
ternational community. And here, again, the true significance of
these achievements has been too little appreciated.
Reference has already been made to the growth of international
administration. Important practices in respect to monetary ad-
ministration, river, railway, and motor transport, suppression of
the white slave traffic, regulation of cables, and other matters
of international concern have been brought into harmony and
uniformity by means of international conferences and conven-
tions. Periodic congresses and permanent international commis-
sions and bureaus have been created to administer agreements
with respect to postal communication, telegraphic and radio-
telegraphic communiation, health and sanitation, patents, trade-
marks, and copyrights, publication of customs tariffs, suppression
27 "It is also indispensable that the science should free itself from the tyranny
of phrases. As things are, there is scarcely a doctrine of the law of nations which
is wholly free from the tyranny of phrases." OPPENHEIMc, THE FUTUm OV INTR-
NATIONAL IAEw, 58 (1921).
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of the opium traffic, suppression of the slave trade and liquor
traffic in Africa, and other subjects of international interest.
In short, in matters of communication, sanitation and health, in-
dustry and commerce, and morals and crime, national administra-
tions have been more or less elaborately supplemented by interna-
tional adndnistration ;2' and, as you are aware, this vast network
of administrative agreements and machinery has recently been uni-
fied, elaborated and strengthened under the supervision of the
League of Nations.
Somewhat less striking, although if anything more significant,
has been the progressive development of the law of nations through
arbitration and judicial decision. The growth of international
arbitration as a means of settling international disputes has been
quite remarkable. Beginning in comparatively recent years, it
progressed rapidly as the nineteenth century advanced and culmi-
nated early in the twentieth century in an important series of arbi-
trations before the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague. It will be enough to refer to the Geneva Arbitration
between the United States and Great Britain in 1872, to the Behr-
ing Sea Arbitration of 1893, and to the North Atlantic Coast Fish-
eries Arbitration of 1909 to remind you of the tremendous im-
portance of this development.2 9 And now, in the twentieth cen-
tury, in addition to arbitration, we have the Permanent Court of
International Justice at The Hague with a gratifying record al-
ready achieved in the settlement of international controversies
according to law. 0 Through the further development of arbitra-
tion and judicial decision, we are assured an adequate means of
amplifying and adapting a rather meager body of law to meet the
needs of a swiftly changing world.
The progressive development of the law of nations through con-
ference and treaty has been rather less noted but is equally sig-
nificant. In some fields of activity, such as navigation and ship-
ping, the adoption of identic regulations and uniform acts has ac-
complished much. In other fields of activity, such as travel and
commerce or the extradition of fugitives from justice, progress has
been made through the multiplication of bilateral treaties. In
21 See REINSCHi, PUBLIc INTERNATIONAL UNIONS (1911); SAyRE, EXPERIMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION (1919).
23 Consult MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY (1898) ; SCOTT, THE HAGUE COURT
REPORTS (1916); WILSON, THE HAGUE ARBITRATION CASES (1915). Judge Moore
is more pessimistic about the progress of arbitration. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SOMB CURRENT ILLUSIONS, Xii, 81 (1924).
so Consult the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUe-
TICS (Jan. 1. 1922-June 15. 1925) ; HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL JUSTICE (1925); MOGsB, "The Permanent Court of INternational Tustce,"
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS, 96.
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still other fields, such as the suppression of the slave trade or the
regulation of the navigation of international rivers, resort has been
had to multi-party or general law-making conventions. Since the
establishment of the League of Nations the growth of the law
through general treaties or conventions has been undoubtedly one
of the most significant phenomena of the time.3' The labor treaties,
the treaties for the protection of minorities, the treaties with re-
spect to transit and communication, and many others have made an
invaluable contribution to the method no less than to the content
of the law of nations. In the rapidly accumulating volumes of the
Treaty Series, published by the League, there is already recorded
a body of new law which is worth many ponderous tomes of the
sort of speculative writing which often passed for international
law in an earlier period. 2
In the developments and institutions thus briefly indicated there
are at work constructive forces which may be expected to in-
fluence the growth of the law of nations much as administration,
judicial decision, and legislation have affected the growth of
private law. The vitality of these forces gives assurance that in-
creasingly in the future as in the more recent past the law of
nations will grow most rapidly in the body of those useful prin-
ciples which are so indispensable in mitigating and adjusting the
innumerable frictions of international life. It gives assurance of
a new law of quite as much concern to the practical statesman as
to the speculative writer. It inspires confidence that the new
law of nations will emerge, indeed that it is even now emerging,
from the phantasmagoria of its unreality.
IV
Reflecting upon the answer to our first inquiry, we were re-
minded that an important explanation for the failure of the law
of nations to function satisfactorily in the past has been the lack
of readily discernible boundaries between the domain of law and
the domain of politics. In a community without organization, the
ordering of relationships has been almost entirely within the con-
s' "In short, the first five years of the League of Nations were years of constant
legislative activity, the fruits of which far surpass those of any previous period
6f te same length In the world's history." Hudson, "The Prospect for Interna-
tional Law In the Twentieth Century," 10 CoRNELL L. QuAn. 419, 460 (1925).
0 See Hudson, "The Codification of International Law Through the League of
Nations," an address before the American Branch of the International Law ADeo-
elation, New York City, Jan. 27, 1923; "The Outlook for the Development of Inter-
national Law," an address before the same organization, New York City, Jan. 9
1925, printed in.American Bar Asso. J., Feb.. 1925; "The Prospect for Intornational
Law in the Twentieth Century," 10 COmlaLL L. QuAn. 419 (1926).
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trol of political authorities within each individual member of the
community. Inevitably the scope and action of law have been too
easily obscured in the intrigue and confusion of diplomacy. Pon-
dering an answer to our second inquiry, we were reminded that
another important explanation for past failures has been the
lack of substance, the unreality, of much that has been relied
upon as law. In a community without organization it has been
much ea.'der to exploit conceptions than to keep the multifarious
rules of everyday conduct abreast of an ever changing need. The
scope and action of law have been too often beclouded in an inter-
minable discussion of theories which, whatever their merit as
theories, could not possibly supply the need for an indispensable
system of rules. Our third inquiry-If rights were flouted, or if
a neighboring nation refused to abide by its obligations, what
could be done about it?-challenges attention to the most signifi-
cant explanation of all. Law in a substantial sense has been de-
nied the opportunity to function efficiently because of the ap-
palling want of adequate remedial rules and institutions.
When rights have been disputed between nations, the one ag-
grieved could negotiate for a settlement. If a settlement was not
obtained by negotiation, there was a possibility that the offending
nation might be persuaded to submit the dispute to arbitration.
To this extent our international institutions for settling controver-
sies have been superior to those of the primitive ape-men. It is un-
likely that ape-men either negotiated or arbitrated. If negotiation
failed and arbitration was rejected the aggrieved nation might try
coercion in the form of threats, display of force, the so-called pa-
cific blockade, reprisals, or other measures of forcible self-help with-
out a declaration of war. Such measures gave no assurance of a just
settlement, but they sometimes produced a kind of settlement, es-
pecially when the aggrieved nation was much more powerful than
its offending neighbor. On the other hand, if power was more or
less evenly balanced, measures of self-help were usually the prelim-
inaries of war. If no settlement was produced by negotiation, ar-
bitration, or the milder forms of self-help, there remained nothing
which the aggrieved nation could do but abandon its contention
or declare war.
Until comparatively recent times the law of nations recognized
only one remedial proceeding in which an independent nation could
be compelled to participate against its will. A nation could not
be compelled to negotiate. It could not be compelled to arbitrate.
*It could not even be compelled, against its wish and free decision,
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to meet reprisal with reprisal. It could be compelled to go to
war. This did not mean that it could be made to fight. It might
choose non-resistance if it pleased. But it did mean that war was
war for both sides, with all its legal incidents and its legal con-
sequences, and that one nation could start it. At the Second
Hague Peace Conference of 1907, the Chinese delegate desired to
know what would happen if one nation declared war upon another
and the other did not wish to fight.33 No reply appears to have
been vouchsafed, but there could be no doubt about the answer.
The second nation would have been at war with the first, whether
it wished to fight or not. The one proceeding in which a nation
could legally compel another independent nation to participate
against its will was war.
It may be because war was the only compulsory remedial pro-
ceeding between nations that it was dignified traditionally as their
litigation. To the primitive mind it was like the judicial combat
in private law. It was an appeal to the God of Battles, a proceed-
ing in which "princes and states, that acknowledge no superior
on earth, shall put themselves upon the justice of God for the
deciding of their controversies by such success as it shall please
Him: to give to either side." 3 4 With the passing of time the God
of Battles became symbolic, but the notion of war as litigation
endured. "To be justifiable," said Grotius, war is "to be carried
on in a no less scrupulous manner than judicial proceedings.' "3
"War," remarked the Supreme Court of the United States, "is
a suit prosecuted by the sword." 36
The law of nations did not create war, for war was one of the
most obvious facts of international relationships long before ever
the law had been conceived. The law of nations found war. Be-
ing impotent to abolish it, and feeling too weak to outlaw it, the law
of nations accepted an unnatural alliance. It attempted to muke
war a little more endurable by developing a system of restrictive
regulations. For those who believe that the attempt was worth
while, there may be some crumbs of comfort in comparing the
3 HiGGNs, THE HAGuE Pn.cE CONYERENCES, 205.
See MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2nd ed., 132.
DE Junn eEmLI AC PAcis, (Whowell's trans].), prolegomena, § 25.
5 Harcourt v,. Gaillard 12 Wh. 523, 528 (1829). See Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253.
307 (1829) ; PH-.. 0RE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 3rd ed., I, 215; I11, 77. "Force still
remains the only ultimate remedy available for nations to obtain satisfaction for
their grievances ..... In municipal law a plaintiff can compel a defendant to ap-
pear before the courts of his country, and if he succeed in his suit the courts will
enforce for him. the judgment he has obtained. There is no similar procedure avail-
able as between nations. This has always been recognized by international law,
and nations who resort to force may acquire special privileges and special rights."
Counter Case of Great Britain, in The Venezuelan Arbitration Before The Hague
Tribunal, 1803, Sen. Dec. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd seass., 974, 983. And see the
Award, ibid., 106.
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conduct of wars in the middle ages with the conflicts of modern
times. It may be that through law wars were made slightly more
tolerable. Even so, there was a death's-head on the other side of
the medal. The immeasurable calamity was that war made the law
imbecile.
The attempt to regulate war by law, as much as any other single
factor, was responsible for the insufficiency of the law of nations.
It absorbed thought and toil which otherwise might have been spent
constructively. It emphasized rules which broke down repeatedly
at the moment When they ought to have been efficacious. For the
lay mind, it identified the law of nations and the law of war, and
so, periodically, when war came and the rules of war were disre-
garded, it brought the whole conception and system of the law of
nations into disreputeI
T
It can never be estimated how much thought and toil have been
lavished in the attempt to make war decent by regulation. The
earlier treatises were usually entitled concerning the rights of
war. The classical treatises of all periods gave more attention to war
and its incidents than to peace. Until comparatively recent times
nations rarely assembled in international conference except to end
a particular war; and when they finally met in conferences called
to promote peace their most labored accomplishment was a new
statement of rules to regulate war. Of three declarations and thir-
teen conventions submitted by the Second Peace Conference at The
Hague, two only of the conventions were devoted primarily to ques-
tions of peace.38 The recent conference at Washington, called
chiefly to check competition in armament and adjust rivalries in
the Pacific and the Far East, prepared a treaty which purported
to taboo the use of noxious gases in warfare and the use of sub-
marines as commerce destroyers and also a resolution calling for
a commission of jurists to consider the amendment of other rules
of war25
01 See "The League of Nations and the Laws of War," British Year Book of
International Law, 1920-21, p. 109, reprinted in 19 Micm L. REV. 833; Sir John
Fischer Williams, "A 'New' International Law," International Law Association,
Report of Thirty-Third Conference, 434 (1924).
w5 Mr. Joseph H. Choate, first delegate to the Second Hague Peace Conference
from the United States, remarked: "We have done much to regulate war, but very
little to prevent it." LA DEUXIEME CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA PAIXn, 1007, II,
830. Sir John Fischer Williams says: "The spectacle of two successive interna-
tional world 'Peace' Conferences at The Hague engaged in the production of two
Conventions for diminishing, and eleven Conventions for regulating, war, if it
arouses the impatience of pacifists, provokes, what is perhaps more serious, the
amused contempt of the ordinary man." International Law Association, Report of
Thirty-Third Conference, 434, 443.
c Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States and Other Powers, III,
3116. See also MOORE, INTERNATIONAL La." AND SoSmB CURRENT ILLUSIONS, 182-
288. Cf. Dickinson, "The Rules of Warfare," THE NEw REPuBIc, XXVIII, Supple-
ment, 30; Haldane, "Chemistry and Peace," THE ATLANTIC MONTIY, Jan. 1925.
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No more can it be estimated how much the flouting of war has
cost the law of nations in diminished prestige. Consider, for illus-
tration, the regulations which established a distinction between
combatants and noncombatants, saving for the latter as much
immunity as possible from the effects of belligerent activity. Here,
as elsewhere, the evidences of usage were searched out and system-
atized. Usages were tempered by treatise-writers' opinions. Con-
ventions prepared in international conferences were widely adopt-
ed. Thus, by persistent effort, the stigma of illegality was attach-
ed to devastation, deportations, executions, and the like.
I would not contend that the stigma was entirely vain, but I
do wish to insist that the medal has had another side. The Pala-
tinate was ravaged; Georgia and the Shenandoah Valley were
branded by the flaming sword; South Africa was terrorized by
burning farms and fetid concentration camps; and Belgium was
devastated and depopulated by an invading host. And after each
event there came disillusionment. For its meager achievement in
mitigating hardships for noncombatants, the law of nations paid
many times over in confidence impaired and prestige destroyed.
Consider another type of restrictive regulation, inspired by the
detestation which new and unusual implements of warfare have
usually provoked. It is well known that the use of new weapons
often encountered the most embittered opposition. Prohibitory
regulations were decreed and even enforced by refusing quarter
to those who failed to observe them. Nevertheless the invention and
use of new weapons moved on apace. There is the famous in-
stance, often cited, of the mediaeval anathema against the use of
the crossbow pronounced by a Catholic Council of the twelfth
century. This implement's use was stigmatized as an art "death-
dealing and hateful to God" and its employment against Christians
was forbidden. It is probably significant of the futility of such
inhibitions that little more than a century passed before the rule
was construed to mean that the crossbow must not be used unless
the cause were just.
40
The crossbow was soon rendered obsolete by the discovery of
gunpowder. Again new contrivances were denounced as unfair
and illegal innovations forbidden by the rules of war. For a long
period it was no uncommon thing for troops to be slain without
mercy as a penalty for using the prohibited weapons. There is
a tradition that the good knight Bayard received his death-wound
I4 See Nys, LaS ORIGINS DU DnOIT INTERNATIONAL, 192; STOWELL AND MUNRO,
INTERNATIONAL CASES, I, 115 n.; WALKER, HISTORY OF THE LAw or NATIONS,125 n.
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from an arquebus ball and died thanking God that he had never
given quarter to an arquebusier. 41  Whether founded in fact or in
fiction, the tradition symbolizes neatly the contest waged between
the ostentatious chivalry of knightly combat and the newer meth-
ods and machinery. The contest was a picturesque one, but its only
achievement was to delay a little the impending revolution.
The contrivance of new weapons, the invention of new projec-
tiles, and the use of new methods followed in swift succession.
We are told that there has been hardly a new device known to
military science which has not at one time or another had an in-
hibition pronounced against it. Chivalric commanders of the
eighteenth century forbade the use of hot shot, hollow shot, and
other tabooed projectiles.4" In the twentieth century command-
ers charged the enemy with the use of dum dum bullets and
other forbidden contrivances, thus providing the raw materials
for propaganda. Viewed as an essay in legal regulation, each suc-
cessive attempt seems if anything to have been more futile than
the last.
43
And history, as is its wont, has repeated itself. At the outbreak
of the World War, poison gas was denounced as "a barbaric
means of warfare prohibited by the laws of war."44 Imperial Ger-
many used it, other belligerents retaliated, and since the war
we have been busily exploring its possibilities as a superhorror in
another great contest. It is probably as certain as any so-called
law in reference to the instrumentalities of warfare could be that
the use of submarines against merchant shipping was illegal in
1915 according to the old traditional code. If there were truly legal
limitations upon the weapons of warfare, the British Attorney-
General was probably right when he declared: "The use of subma-
rines against commerce must necessarily remain illegal until inter-
national law has made express provision for their employment.
The introduction of new engines of destruction must conform
to the law as it is; it is contrary to all reason and all conceptions
of jurisprudence for any nation to claim that the existing law
becomes obsolete on the invention of new appliances of warfare." 5
Nevertheless the submarine made its own atrocious code. And
who can doubt that it will be enployed even more effectively if
another great maritime war ever comes?
d' See wAL ER, HISTORY OF THE LAW Op NATIONS, 190.
42 See HA.LLEC, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 398.
43 See MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2nd ed., 123, 138.
4 Report of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry, April 24, 1915, in STOWULL AND
IUNRO, INTERNATIONAL CASES, II, 117
r5 SIFREDRmCK SLUTH, THE DESTRUCTION OF MERCHANT SHS UNDER INTRNA-
TONAL LAw, 53 (1917).
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The second treaty of Washington, recently drafted by repre-
sentatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and
Japan, expressly prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating, pois-
onous, or other gases. It also purported to outlaw the submarine
by restating the old code of the sea, making any infraction there-
of piracy, and prohibiting the use of under-surface craft as com-
merce destroyers. We are reminded again that when Treves had
been well nigh destroyed by the barbarians the first petition from
its few surviving nobles implored the Emperor to re-establish the
circus games as a measure of relief for the ruined city.
If it should be thought that the illustrations selected have been
in any respect untrue to the mass, then call the publicists them-
selves to testify. Richard Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical Polity,
published in 1594, referred to the "laws of arms which yet are
much better known than kept." 4  Writing a generation later,
Hugo Grotius saw many and grave causes why he should write a
book on the rights of war and peace, for he saw "prevailing
throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which
even barbarous nations would have been ashamed; recourse be-
ihg had to arms for slight reasons or no reason, and when arms
were once taken up, all reverence for divine and human law was
thrown away, just as if men were thenceforth authorized to commit
all crimes without restraint." 7
William Edward Hall, an eminent British publicist, writing in
1889, made the following prophetic observations:
"In times when wars have been both long and bitter, in mo-
ments of revolutionary passion, on occasions when temptation
and opportunity of selfishness on the part of neutrals have been
great, men have fallen back into disregard of law and even into
true lawlessness. And it would be idle also to pretend that
Europe is not now in great likelihood moving towards a time
at which the strength of international law will be too hardly
tried. Probably in the next great war the questions which have
accumulated during the last half century and more, will all be
given their answers at once. Some hates moreover will crave
for satisfaction; much envy and greed will be at work; but
above all, and at the bottom of all, there will be the hard sense
of necessity. Whole nations will be in the field; the comimerce
of the world may be on the sea to Win or lose; national exist-
ences will be at stake; men will be tempted to do anything
which will shorten hostilities and tend to a decisive issue. Con-
duct in the next war will certainly be hard; it is very doubtful
if it will be scrupulous, whether on the part of belligerents
or neutrals; and most likely the next war will be great."48
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THE NEW LAW OF NATIONS
Only a few years before the outbreak of the World War, Sir
Thomas Barclay warned us that "too much confidence must not
be placed in regulations concerning the conduct of war." "Mili-
tary necessity," he continued, "the heat of action, the violence
of the feelings which come into play will always at times defeat
the most skillfully combined rules diplomacy can devise.' '
4
Too much confidence could not be placed in the codes of war
because confidence thus placed would be requited with disillusion-
ment. Then must we not have the courage to say that the law
ought to have disowned war ? Must we not accept the inexorable
conclusion that effective legal regulation of war was an impossi-
bility ? The reasons supporting such a conclusion seem obvious
enough. For one thing, the attempt to regulate war by law was
necessarily an attempt to make law in vacuo. The war codes
were formulated in peace time in the light only of an earlier war
time experience. Afore recently, indeed, they were not only made
in peace time but in international peace conferences. Of necessity
they were wholly static. And yet, while they were being formu-
lated, while statesmen were giving lip homage and soldiers were
hardly concealing their skepticism, dynamic science and the pro-
gress of discovery were transforming the conditions under which
the next war would be waged. There was no adequate test of the
codes until the next war came and they are almost certain to be
shattered in the test.
For another reason, the inherent nature of war has precluded
effective legal regulation. War was abnormous, the denial of
regulation, the exaltation of force."1 As well legislate for the
waves of the sea or attempt to prescribe the tempest's course.
In the middle ages lawgivers attempted to define the procedure
of jettison and stipulated who should be first consulted and the
goods first to be thrown overboard. An old judge of Genoa is
said to have observed that in more than a half century's experience
he had known of only four or five instances of jettison according
to the rule and these were suspected of fraud because the forms
4 "Laws of War," -fCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, XXVIII, 312, 316.
S"How can we defend a conception of International Law which puts rules for
the conduct of a process destructive of civilization on a par with the rules for the
organization of the civilized relations of States? The function of International
Law is not to spend half its time as a despised and ineffective referee at a peculiar-
ly bloody form of gladiatorial contest-a contest, indeed. in which the distinction
between spectators and gladiators has worn very thin." Sir John Fischer Wil-
liams, "A 'New' International Law," International Law Association, Report of
Thirty-Third Conference, 434, 443.'a .'In treating the laws of war between belligerents as being law at all, we
have little else on which to ground ourselves than that the general opinion of the
international society assists in shaping the rules, and allows each party to enforce
their observance towards himself if he is able to do so. But again we are met by
the fact that here, of all parts of international law, the opportunities for giving a
definite expression to opinion, and for a party's doing himself that right which
opinion demands, are at the lowest" WESTLAX, COLLECTED PAPERS, 238.
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had been too well observed. The law's neat precepts proved futile
when subjected to the stress of storm. 2  What was war if not a
seething storm?
While the law of nations must eventually disown war and all
its incidents,, we need not shudder at the prospect of wars Waged
without restraint. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe
that conduct in war will conform in the future, as much as in the
past, to primitive but no less indispensable regulations. These
regulations are not of a legal kind. They are the expression in
rules of residuary moral forces, of our more humane instincts,
and even of bald expediency. No doubt they will continue to be
written down in manuals for the use of armed forces in the field.
Uniformity will be attained in respect to at least the more elemental
principles through conventions prepared in international confer-
ences attended by military and naval experts. Such codes will
continue to be an indispensable part of the soldier's equipment.
Within the armed forces they will aid, as they have in the past,
in maintaining discipline, while Without they will insure against
the more pitiless forms of retaliation. In their improvement the
best traditions of the service may be conserved and strengthened.
Useful as they may be, in their own peculiar sphere, the new
law of nations will include naught of such regulations. If it is to
deserve the confidence so essential to its progress, it will be
divorced from all elaborately legalized methods of self-redress. It
will outlaw war.as Does the suggestion, thus moderately defined,
seem idealistic? It is no more idealistic than what we have at-
tempted in the past. If wars cannot actually be abolished by
being outlawed, neither can they be civilized by being subjected
to regulation. To attempt the one is no more idealistic than to
attempt the other; and there is this difference, that outlawing
war at least makes the law respectable and opens the way to
rational progress, while attemfpting to regulate war destroys con-
]2 EMERIGON, TRAITE DES ASSURANCES, I, 591 (1827).
M To "outlaw war" in the sense in which that expression is here used Is not to
interdict or proscribe it. That would be absurdly futile. It does not even imply
that war is to be denounced as illegal. The significance of such a denunciation
would probably depend upon the efficacy of Instrumentalities created to prevent
war. To "outlaw war" as the expression is here used is to deny it the countenance
and approval of the law, to relegate it to the class of those abnormal acts or con-
ditions which are admittedly incapable of effective regulation by any system of
positive law. The author's conception of outlawed war probably goes but little
beyond the conclusion of Sir John Fischer Williams, who says: "What is the
upshot? Not that we have reached a point in human development when we can
do without a law of war; on that point Ayala Is still in the right. As long as war
remains, lawyers must make an effort to subject it to rules, but that at our present
stage of developmsnt the International Law of War is far less effective and far
less important than the International Law of Peace, and that the effort of the
new International Law must be to develop the law of peace and no longer allow
itself to be pre-occupied almost as much with war as with peace." International
Law Association, Report of Thirty-Third Conference, 434, 446. See ulso BnOWN,
INTERNATIONAL REiArS, 3, 6.
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fidence and obstructs the natural avenues of growth. Wars will
be no better for being outlawed; neither will they be any worse.
But the law of nations may become infinitely better as the forces
deterrining its progress are directed to the improvement of rules
controlling peaceful intercourse and especially to the development
of essentially lawful methods for settling international disputes.
There is much to assure us that the forces determining the pro-
gress of the law of nations will be thus directed in increasing meas-
ure as time goes on. I have already referred to the remarkable
development of arbitration and of the methods and machinery
of arbitration. It is evident that this development is still in an
early stage and that much more may be expected from it in the
future. Even more significant has been the establishment of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the organization of
the processes of international judicial decision. The court has
been signally successful in its beginning years, has already demon-
strated its indispensable utility, and may be expected to grow in
usefulness and prestige in the years to come. It is especially sig-
nificant that the commission of jurists which prepared the plan
for the court recommended that it have compulsory jurisdiction in
certain classes of controversies in which it was thought that judi-
cial settlement would be peculiarly appropriate and that more than
a score of the less powerful nations of the world have accepted
such jurisdiction in ratifying the court.5
Reference has also been made to the extraordinary progress
achieved in the nineteenth century in the use of conferences and
to the natural culmination of this progress in the periodic confer-
ences of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations. It is
noteworthy that conferences have not only contributed in innumer-
able ways to the progressive integration of the international society
and provided an invaluable means of supplementing and improving
the content of the law but that they have also become an indis-
pensable agency for avoiding, assuaging, and settling international
disputes. They have been increasingly useful in the disposition of
disputes which are not well suited for arbitral or judicial settle-
ment. Furthermore it is a striking thing that recent conferences
of the League of Nations have been content to labor in the vine-
yards of justice and conciliation. They have so far contributed
FA Annual Report of the Permanent Court, 137 (1925).
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nothing whatever to the refinement of the so-called, laws of war.es
Better one abortive Geneva Protocol dedicated to the hope that na-
tions in their mutual relationships may achieve justice through
law"5 than a dozen conventions on war and neutrality. Better a
single security compact, of the kind now under consideration in
Europe,57 than many futile attempts to prescribe in detail what
shall be done when security is gone.
The new law of nations, I am convinced, will place less emphasis
relatively upon the right of each separate nation to ignore its
neighbor, exalt its oWn particular interest, or set the world aflame
in seeking redress of its grievances. It will lay increasing stress
as time goes on upon the social interests of the great society.
The demand for a better organized community will become progres-
sively more insistent. We shall have a vast deal of experimenting
with commissions, courts, and conferences, informal unions and
more fornmal leagues-crude, ungainly institutions in the begin-
ning-and out of this experimenting we shall build institutions
which are competent not only to delimit the domain of law more
clearly in relation to politics, not only to contribute more of sub-
stance to the body of the law, not only to provide indispensable
remedial methods and institutions, but above all and compre-
hending all to conserve and advance the common well-being of the
great society in a way commensurate with its paramount im-
portance.
rz See "The League of Nations and the Laws of war," British Year Book of
International Law, 1920-21, p. 109, reprinted in 19 MIcH,. L. Rnv. 885. See also
Wickersham, "The Restatement of International Law," AzemICAN LAW SCHOOL REy.
V, 455. It is significant that the League's Committee of Experts on Codification
has thus far considered only questions of peace, postponing questions of war and
neutrality to a later day.
It is significant, also, that the American Institute of International Law, in pro-
paring draft projects of conventions for the codification of so-called American
international law, has confined Its efforts to the law of peace. See Codification
of American International Law, 3, 6, 25 (pamphlet published by the Bureau of
American Republics, 1925); Scott, "The Codification of International Law in
America," Proceedings American Society of International Law, 1925, pp. 14, 17.
r4 See BA= R, THE GENEVA PROTOCOL (1925); Mirage, THn GENEVA PROTOCOL
(1925) ; HUDsON, "The Geneva Protocol," FoREIGN Ars'iRs, Dec., 1924.
Texts of the Locarno treaties have been printed, since this address was deliver-
ed, in the New York Times, October 20, 1925.
